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Abstract: In this paper we motivate a specific formulation for preference that exhibits both
love for variety and love for novelty. This enables to investigate the effects of ageing of
imperfect substitutes, as they became progressively old-fashioned, due to the obsolescence of
their aesthetic features. First, we assume that the industry is divided into several sub-markets,
each dominated by a single firm that produces a variety of a given vintage. We show that
equilibrium prices decrease, as goods become older. Assuming a fixed cost to be paid, the
evolution of demand determines the equilibrium number of varieties at the point where the
oldest vintage firm earns zero profits. Second, we consider the model under a free entry
condition assumption. Each sub-market of a given vintage is saturated with a number of
varieties such that the market share of each firm is barely sufficient to realise zero profits. We
show in a particular case that, in equilibrium, markets of the youngest varieties are
characterised by a larger number of firms than markets offering older varieties. More
specifically, the lifetime horizon of each variety will be characterised by decreasing prices
accompanied by increasing demand levels.
JEL Classification: D43, L11, L13
21. Introduction
Economic literature relating to innovation and differentiation of products make use of
standard specification of preference, which enable to model individual's desire to experience
"new" goods in two senses. There is first the "new" in the sense of a newly created good.
Convexity of preference (Spence, 76; Dixit-Stiglitz, 77) implies that individuals like to
consume many types of a given good. Such taste for variety provides the fundamental
incentive for basic innovation aimed at introducing differentiated products into the market.
Second, there is the "new" in the sense of an improved good. People like best goods of
the last generation whenever they offer a better quality than the older ones. Improved quality
of existing goods shifts outwards the utility function, potentially rewarding a successful R&D
effort with larger market shares1. Th refore, both approaches to product innovation relate the
idea of "new" to physical qualities of goods, either in the sense of the improvement of their
technical characteristics, or in the sense of a new variety, physically differentiated from those
available in the market.
Indeed, several peculiar aspects of modern consumerism do not seem to be entirely
concerned with the process of innovation above mentioned. Hirschman (1981) proposes that
product innovation can be classified along two dimensions, a symbolic one related to new
social meanings of goods and a technological representation by tangible features that are new
to the product category. For example, consumers' rate of replacement of manufactured goods
such as clothes or shoes appear to be substantially unrelated to any process of wearing out or
physical obsolescence. Similar common evidence may be found in other commodity areas
such as furniture and furnishing, cultural products, and entertainment activities, and in general
it seems to apply to all those sectors in which aesthetics represent a prominent aspect of
goods2.
According to modern sociology, the exceptionally high turnover of goods,
accompanied by the raising of the threshold of what consumers consider "worn out" beyond
any observable need for their replacement, constitutes the distinctive mark of modern
consumerism, and the observable consequence of contemporary hedonism.
In particular, the key factor driving the continual pursuing of pleasure is seen to be
closely related to the “desire for the new”, that prompts hedonist consumers towards those
goods, which enter the commodity space as novelties, i.e. displaying new aesthetic features,
aimed at launching them as fashionable goods3. Thus, the sociological approach to
contemporary consumerism concerns chiefly with "the nature, origin and functioning of the
process through which novelty is continuously created, introduced into society and then
disseminated through all social classes" (Campbell (1992), p. 48).
Economic literature relating to the phenomena of fashion and aesthetic innovation
considers that consumption externalities, such as ‘bandwagon’ and ‘snob’ effects, arouse
                                         
1 The relevance of quality improvement is well established in endogenous growth literature. For references and
surveys see, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Grossman and Helpman (1991).
2 See Kusamitsu (1991) for a historical perspective of the extension of novelty from exotic items to non-luxury
goods.
3 The novelty character of a commodity may be not the consequence of a true aesthetic innovation - such as that
noticeable in the clothing sector - but may be borrowed from the setting surrounding the presentation of the
product. Goods that are not very apt to aesthetic revolutions, such as mineral water, rely upon the presence of
unusual metaphors in their advertisement presentation to strike the imagination of consumers and gain
attractiveness. In Channels of Desire (Ewen and Ewen, 1982) the authors investigate how mass images, new
advertising, and fashion are channelled into consumption, and into the desire for ever new goods.
3signalling strategies among heterogeneous groups of consumers (Becker (1991), Pesendorfer
(1995), and Bagwell and Bernheim (1996)).
In the present paper we depart from the assumption of heterogeneous consumers,
trying an alternative economic investigation of aesthetic innovation within a baseline setting
of monopolistic competition; the demand side of the model arises from the choices of a
representative consumer who displays preference for novelty.
To model this particular aspect of the observed behaviour of consumers within a
standard specification of preferences, we consider the love for novelty to affect individual
utility as a particular discount rate. Let us consider two goods that differ as to their vintage,
i.e. one is fashionable whereas the other one is out of date. We assume that consumers
evaluates the older type in terms of the vintage of the newest one through a particular discount
rate, which expresses their subjective rate of preference for novelty. Furthermore, we motivate
our preference specification proposing an alternative aggregation procedure among imperfect
substitutes, when the discount factor accounts for different qualities of goods.
The demand side of the model is then described by a representative consumer who
exhibits both love for variety - in the sense originally proposed by Spence (1976) and Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) - and for novelty. The latter aspect brings an asymmetry in preferences, which
have the crucial consequence to let the price elasticity of demand depend on the firms’ price
strategy.
On the supply side, we assume that each firm retains a perpetual monopoly power over
the variety it produces4. Firms maximise profits setting prices so as to exploit all the market
power resulting from the physical differentiation of goods and from their relative age.
In particular, we take into consideration two alternative conditions of equilibrium for
the market as a whole. First, we assume that only one firm populates each sub-market5. Under
this hypothesis we show that equilibrium prices decrease, as goods become older. The optimal
price change rate, however, only partially compensates consumers for the ageing of goods. As
a result, each firm faces a declining market share over the lifetime of its product. In particular,
assuming a fixed cost to be paid each period, the evolution of demand determines the
equilibrium number of varieties at the point where the oldest vintage firm earns zero profit6.
Second, we consider the model under a free entry condition assumption. In particular,
as we rule out imitation, each firm can freely enter the market by introducing a new
differentiated variety. In this context each sub-market of a given vintage is saturated with a
number of varieties such that the market share of each firm is barely sufficient to realise zero
profits. We show that, in equilibrium, markets of the youngest varieties are characterised by a
larger number of firms than markets offering older varieties. In particular, the lifetime horizon
of each variety will be characterised by decreasing prices accompanied by increasing demand
levels. Therefore, assuming a free entry condition, we obtain a result, which seems consistent
with the continual process of creation and destruction of aesthetic patterns, observed in mass
                                         
4 This assumption applies to those sectors, such as fashion, in which the monopoly power gained by a successful
aesthetic innovation is copyrighted by the "name", or "griff " of the firm, in a similar way as an artwork piece is
protected by the signature of the artist. In both cases fakes are illegal.
5 This would be the same as to assume that on average only one firm per period is able to enter the market as a
consequence of a successful R&D effort.
6 Each type available in the market is characterised by a vintage date. The vintage provides a pseudo-dynamic
interpretation of the model, which is static in nature. In equilibrium, the price set by a firm producing a good of
vintage v one period later will be the same price set in the current period by the firm operating in the market of
vintage (v +1). Therefore, the equilibrium number of varieties corresponds to the lifetime of each single variety.
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consumption societies, where the highest demand levels for a single good are associated with
a "sale", that concludes its lifetime cycle.
2. The commodity index under quality vs. novelty differentiation
To model preferences that exhibit both love for variety and love for novelty, we start
from a general specification of the market commodity space defined by a matrix
X = {xi(v)} ;  i = 1, 2, ... ;  v = 0, 1, ...
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where the generic element, xi(v), represents the variety i of vintage v. The dimension of X is
given by the number of firms (n(v)) populating each sub-market by the number of sub-
markets T, each supplying differentiated types of a given vintage. The dimension of X is
endogenous, and depends on the assumed market structure. The X space is characterised by
goods that imperfectly substitute for each other. In addition, we assume that each variety
displays peculiar characteristics, which are specific to the period since it was first put on the
market. These vintage-specific features introduce a vertical dimension of differentiation
which, in principle, reflect either a process of improved quality of goods or a process of
aesthetic renovation. It seems reasonable to assume that these two alternative dimensions of
the product innovation are perceived distinctively by consumers. This implies that aesthetic
attributes and quality standards of goods should enter the utility function differently. To
synthesise the X space through a commodity index we proceed first by aggregating varieties
along the vintage dimension, deriving two alternative procedures that account for quality and
aesthetics. Then we aggregate horizontally in a standard manner.
Let 0<e<1 be the average degree of substitution between any pair of goods in the
market commodity space. Consider the -th row of X; we suggest the following index (xiQ) to
be appropriate, when the vintage dimension reflects the quality progress of a given variety:
[1]
On the other hand, when the vintage dimension reflects the aesthetic pattern evolution,
the following alternative index  (xiN) is appropriate:
[2]
the discount factor l in [1] and [2] captures two kind of obsolescence. In [1] it reflects the
ageing of goods due to the better quality of the most recent varieties. In [2] it measures the
distance, in terms of aesthetic features, of a given variety from the most on fashion one.
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To motivate the employment of xiN as a proper index to capture the aesthetic
obsolescence of goods, we consider [1] and [2] as varieties tend to be independent (e® 0).
We get two different Cobb-Douglas specifications:
[3]
[4]
Since quality assessments are made in relative and not in absolute terms, the vintage
effect disappears as goods tend to be independent. In other words, it is common evidence that
individuals can weigh the quality level of a given good only in comparison with similar goods
able to satisfy the same need. As a result, with independent goods the asymmetry in [1]
vanishes and consumers allocate a constant fraction 1/T of their income resources for each of
the available commodities.
On the other hand, the aesthetic dimension of commodities may be still comparable
among independent goods. It might be considered an idle question to ask which, between a
Giotto painting and petrol can, is characterised by the highest quality in a physical sense. On
the contrary, it might have sense to submit Giotto and petrol can to a pure aesthetic judgement
– and in a post-pop art society it cannot be quite taken for granted a preference for Giotto! In
particular, as the aesthetic pattern of goods is characterised along a vintage dimension,
potentially we can account for two phenomena, strictly connected, and crucial to the current
mass consumption pattern: fashion and love for novelty.
Now, under the profile of fashion and novelty, the observed behaviours lead us to
admit that even independent goods are comparable. Therefore, specification [2], considered
when goods are independent in the limit, formalises the idea that modern consumers are
willing to allocate relatively more resources to the newest good, to the extent they are
perceived as most on fashion (or trendy) and/or most distinguished as novelties.
For the above explained reasons, we consider [1] to be an appropriate index when
imperfect substitutes are differentiated along a quality dimension; whereas, specification [2] is
consistent with imperfect substitutes vertically differentiated as far as their fashion/quality
character is considered. Finally, the two aggregate commodity indices synthesising the X
space under the two alternative interpretations of l are obtained summing xiQ and xiN in a
standard way along the number of brands available:
[5]
We want to study the different interpretation of l s preference for quality opposed to
l as preference for novelty.
l as preference for novelty is a complex psychological parameter which results from
the cultural, social, and moral ground that surrounds and characterises individuals in a given
historical time. On the other hand, the preference for quality derives from the rational effort to
objectively evaluate technical features of commodities, such as safety, handiness,
maintenance costs and so on, which depend on the profit maximising strategy of firms. In this
sense we might say that the preference for quality is a parameter endogenously determined by
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the evolution of the market, whereas the preference for novelty derives from a more general
evolution of the society as a whole.
3. The demand side of the model
A single representative consumer, whose preferences exhibit both love for variety and
love for novelty, describes the demand side of the model. The former quality implies that
individual are better off spreading a given amount of resources among a variety of
differentiated goods, instead of allocating it on a single variety. The latter one entails that
newer types are more desirable than older ones, in the sense that consumers gradually distaste
goods as they move away from the time of their invention.
We first assume that T sub-markets supply T imperfectly substitutable varieties of
vintage v = 0, 1, ..., T - 1. We will consider the opposite case in section 6, where imperfect
substitutes of the same vintage can freely enter the market. Under the assumption of a single
firm operating in each of the T sub-markets, the X space reduces to a row vector X = [x(0)
x(1) ... x(v) ... x(T-1)]. In this case the aggregate commodity c reduces to
[6]
Again, the l parameter represents the rate of preference for novelty. It captures the
psychological attraction of consumers towards varieties that enter the commodity space with
the label “new” or “novel” attached to them. In other words, l represents the rate at which
types of a given brand become less valued due to the fact that at each period newer varieties
are available7.
The choice problem faced by the representative consumer can then be stated as
follows (we suppress the N subscript):
where u(.) is a utility function with standard properties, p(v) is the price of type x(v), and E is
the constant fraction of total income resources allocated to the commodity space X8.
The solution of the above static maximisation problem yields the demand function for
the good of vintage v:
 [7]
                                         
7 Middleton (1986) proposes a theoretical apparatus to model the preference for subjective novelty based on
experimental psychology.
8 We are implicitly assuming a Cobb-Douglas specification of a general utility function, whose arguments are
the varieties in X through the aggregate index c and a numeraire commodity collecting all the other existing
goods.
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where s = 1/(1- e) is the elasticity of substitution between pairs of varieties, and P is the
weighted sum of the purchasing power of one unit of nominal expenditure allocated to all the
available varieties9.
The price elasticity of demand relevant to the firm producing x(v) is the :
[8.1]
or, substituting from [7]:
[8.2]
Equation [8.1] and [8.2] illustrate the sources of market power enjoyed by firms. The
price elasticity of demand is higher the lower is the elasticity of substitution s and the larger
the fraction of E allocated to x(v). In particular, the first component of e(v) measures, from the
standpoint of consumer's preference, the average degree of physical differentiation between
pairs of varieties, which is exogenous. Instead, the second component of e(v) sh ws hat the
decline of the market share due to the ageing of goods depends on the price strategy set by
firms.
Furthermore, the second component of the price elasticity cannot be disregarded even
for an increasingly large number of firms10. Since the terms in the price index are non-
negative we apply the criterion of ratio to investigate the convergence property of P.
Sufficient condition for P to converge is
which is always satisfied, as we will show (section 4) that firms optimally choose to
decrease prices at a rate greater than [(1+l)s/(1-s) – 1] 11.
In the next section we show how the behaviour of firms determines the optimal path of
decay of their market share, as goods become progressively old-fashioned.
                                         
9 To gain more interpretation of P, let consider the indirect utility function V = E P1/(s – 1) . Thus, P(s – 1)
represents the average cost of acquiring one unit of indirect utility which is precisely P w en  = 2.
10 The effects of the aggregate price index on the price elasticity can be found in Yang and Heijdra (1993)
considering symmetric preferences. However, the assumption of symmetry has the implication that the elasticity
approaches a constant as the number of firms increase.
11 It is worth noting that assuming the set of potential varieties to be a continuum would give price elasticity
precisely equal to s, involving misleading conclusions about firm’s behaviour. See Helpman and Krugman
(1986, page 119).
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4.  Price setting and the ‘evolution’ of demand
In a monopolistically competitive setting the T firms operating in the market maximise
profits setting prices such that marginal costs are equalised to marginal revenues. This
condition for the price of good x(v) can be expressed in terms of the price elasticity of
demand:
[9]
where w is the constant marginal cost. By replacing (v) with its expression (equation 8.2) we
obtain an equation of degree s, that embodies the optimal pricing rule followed by firms:
[10]
The optimal price is equal to the Dixit-Stiglitz price plus an additional factor, which is
higher the younger is the variety12.
As it is not possible to obtain an explicit solution of the above equation, we work out
the optimal price strategy of firms by examining the behaviour of gp, the price change rate
between (v + 1) and v. From equation [9] we obtain:
[11]
where gx is the demand change rate between varieties of vintage (v + 1) and v. The first factor
in equation [11] is positive; as a consequence the sign of gp depe ds on the sign of [(1+ gp) (1
+ gx) - 1]:
[12]
From the demand equation (equation 7) we derive the expression for gx as a function
of gp:
[13]
Substituting equation [13] for gx into condition [12] we get:
[14]
As s >1 and l > 0, gp ³ 0 can never be verified. Therefore, in equilibrium gp must be
negative and greater than:
                                         
12 Fisher et al. (1962) estimate that the 25% of the purchase price of a new car includes the cost of its aesthetic
novelty.
9Given that it is optimal to decrease prices, as goods become progressively outdated,
the demand change rate behaviour gx can be deduced from equation [11]. By noting that the
fraction is a number less than one, we have that:
which, in turn, implies that gx be negative.
The behaviour of demand is fundamentally driven by the lure exerted on consumers by
new varieties entering the market. The consequent distaste for older types erodes
progressively firms’ market share. Firms react by making only partial price compensation to
consumers, and let their monopoly power then decline. In other words, emphasising the
pseudo-dynamic side of the story, each firm knows that each period a new variety enter the
market. As a result the objective to protect its market share through full price compensation is
not feasible. It is optimal to partially offset the ageing of goods with successive price
reductions in order to maximise overall profits over the firm’s lifetime.
Finally, the equilibrium number of varieties (or, equivalently, the optimal lifetime of
the firm) depends on the technology prevailing in the industry. We take a fixed cost to be paid
by each firm operating within the market. Given that prices and demand decrease as the goods
grows older, the presence of some fixed factor of production entails that the older the vintage
the higher the average costs faced by firms. This, in turn, implies that prices and average costs
as a function of v, will intersect at a point that determines the equilibrium value of T, the
number of varieties, or, which is the same, the life duration of a single variety.
In next section we will consider a special case of the model to work out an explicit
solution to T.
5. The optimal brands’ life
In this section the optimal number of varieties supplied in the market, or equivalently,
the optimal life of each variety will be determined13. A firm supplies a brand as far as costs do
not exceed revenues. We can depict a price curve describing the optimal price setting for all
brands, with vintage v = 0, 1, ..., (T – 1). Moreover, a corresponding average cost curve can be
obtained for the same types. From the results obtained in section 4, it is easy to show that the
former curve is decreasing and the latter one is increasing, as the brand becomes older. There
will be a variety for which price is equal to average cost, indicated at the intersection of the
price curve and the average cost curve. Older types do not guarantee non-negative profits, so
exit the market is the optimal action.
In order to obtain an explicit solution we assume s = 214. Moreover, we consider
normalised prices, setting p(0) = 1. As a consequence, we consider relative prices. E, CF, and
w are expressed in relative terms as well. For example, our result stating that optimal prices
                                         
13 Rink and Swan (1979) investigate the strategy of introducing aesthetic variations in a given good to extend its
‘life cycle’.
14 A second order equation is obtained. Only one solution is admitted, since the other one does not guarantee a
unit relative price of the good with v = 0.
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are greater than the constant Dixit-Stiglitz prices, which implies (v) > 2w , restricts now the
marginal cost w to be less than one half. For simplicity we do not change the notation, so from
now on, all variables are normalised. It is easy to show that
The oldest firm v = (T – 1) realises zero profits. In order to find T, we substitute the
above expressions in the firm’s zero profit condition. This in turn is equal to the number of
varieties, which is
T is positive and greater than 1 for CF sufficiently smaller than E. In particular, the
time-life of a single variety or, equivalently, the number of brands depends both on
parameters characterising preference and technology. The effect of a higher degree of
preference for novelty is a lower number of brands15; higher expenditure levels rises T. On the
technology side, higher marginal costs and fixed costs reduce the time-life of goods.
6. A model of free entry
So far we have assumed that firms face only the competition of types with different
vintages provided that in each sector of vintage v only on  firm is present.
We can ask which is the possible behaviour when (horizontal) monopolistic
competition within sub-markets is admitted with an assumption of imperfect substitution. The
commodity space is now described by the general specification X, so that we proceed as
showed in section 2 to obtain the aggregate commodity index. The resulting consumer’s
maximisation problem can be stated as follows:
                                         
15 By numerically simulating the model for different values of the elasticity of substitution s we can s a e that
the increase of the degree of preference for novelty always implies a decrease in the optimal life for all brands.
Results for different s show only scale effects without qualitative changes in our conclusions.
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where 
In the Spence and Dixit-Stiglitz framework, commodities enter the utility function
symmetrically so in equilibrium it is true that for all v xi(v) = xj(v) = x(v) and pi(v) = pj(v) =
p(v), when firms face the same costs. It is easy to check that, similarly as in equation [7], the
demand for any variety i of vintage v is
[15]
where P is the aggregate index, which measures the purchasing power of one unit of
expenditure E in terms of utility. The corresponding price elasticity is
[16]
The standard optimal pricing condition, marginal costs equal to marginal revenues,
provides the following equation:
[17]
As we cannot work out an explicit solution for any s, we consider the relevant
variables (p, n, and x) expressed in terms of change rates (gp, gn, and gx respectively).
All the change rates can be calculated from a three-equation system given by: i) the
necessary first order condition to find the maximum profit; ii) the p imal demand of any
good of vintage v that warrants a maximum utility level; iii) the zero profit condition. The
conditions provide the following relations respectively
[18]
where
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The non-linear system [18] cannot be solved for any s > 1. However, we can state
some general insights without solving it. It is easy to check that the system implies that only
one of the following set of inequalities is consistent with the conditions in [18]:
{gn > 0, gp > 0, gx < 0}
{gn < 0, gp < 0, gx >0}.
At the moment, we can state that price lowers (increases) and the market share
increases (decreases) as the good becomes older if the number of firms is higher (lower) in
relatively young sectors. But we do not know if the number of firms increases or decreases
with the vintage.
We can show in the particular case where s = 2 that the number of firms in the old
sector is lower than the number of firms in the young sector by exploiting the condition of
equal profits in all (old and new) markets when firms set the optimal price.
For s = 2 equation [17] can be easily solved
[19]
where f º (1 – w)/(1 – 2w). To have a real solution the following condition must be satisfied
for all v >0:
[20]
The marginal cost has to be lower than a certain value as a necessary condition to
ensure the existence of both old and young markets. If the condition is not verified only the
youngest variety will be supplied by each of the n(0) survived firms at the Dixit-Stiglitz price.
We assume for simplicity that v = 1 and denote the share of the number of old firms to
the number of young firms with N, n(1)/n(0) º N. Then equation [19] becomes
[21]
Again, as in section 5, we consider the relative price of good of vintage v = 1 imposing
the price of the newest variety equal to one, p(0) = 1. Demand for goods v = 016 and v = 1 are
respectively given by the following expressions:
                                         
16 To guarantee the existence of several firms with v = 0, n(0) ³ 1, it suffices that the fixed cost of production CF
be lower than (or at least equal to) E(1 – 2w).
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[22]
We insert equations [21] and [22] in the arbitrage condition of equal profits in all markets,
p(1) = p(0), obtaining the following equation
[23]
Expression [21] for the price of age 1 can be inserted into equation [23] to get a non-
linear equation, which can be solved by setting
We find two solutions for A. Solving back for N we find
so we have two roots for N, a negative and a positive one. We reject the former one. The latter
solution is the following
For its existence as a real number, it ne ds to satisfy the condition
which corresponds to condition [20] when v = 1. We have already remarked that the condition
guarantees the existence of varieties born at different dates. We also know that (1 – 2w) > 0
(or w < ½). Therefore N is a positive number and we can easily show that N < 1. Therefore,
the number of firms in the old market with age v = 1 is smaller than the number of firms in the
youngest market with v = 0. In general, we have
where again n(v) < n(0). Moreover, it is also easy to show that n(v) > n(v + t), for all t > 0,
implying that the number of firms’ change rate is always negative, gn< 0.
7. Concluding remarks
In this paper we have modelled a market in which a single good is offered in many
varieties, differentiated along two dimensions. The first relates to the process of physical
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differentiation of goods. The second captures the effects of ageing of goods, as they became
progressively old-fashioned, due to the obsolescence of their aesthetic features.
On the demand side, we have extended a standard specification of preference to
include both love for variety and love for novelty. This latter aspect has been introduced
through a particular discount rate that weights the utility derived from goods of different
vintage. Therefore, our setting is able to represent an important aspect of the observed pattern
of consumption, where the lifetime of goods is largely unrelated to their physical duration, but
depends decisively on the aesthetic cycle determined by the phenomenon of fashion.
In the first part of the paper we assume that the market is divided into several sub-
markets dominated by a single firm, that produces a variety of a given vintage. Within this
context the market power of each firm, gained through physical and aesthetic innovation, is
progressively eroded by the entry of new varieties. This effect is captured by the elasticity of
demand, which is the sum of two elements. The first, which measures the average degree of
physical differentiation, and the second, which shows the decline of market power as time
passes due to the increasing distaste for older types. The latter element is not worthless even if
the number of varieties goes to infinity.
The optimal firms’ behaviour consists of making only partial price compensation to
consumers due to the ageing of goods, so the objective of maintaining the market share
constant is rationally not achieved. The decline of demand is transferred into an expansion of
average costs. The decreasing performance of prices and the increase of average cost, as
goods become older, implies that the equilibrium number of brands is finite. Or, conversely,
reading the result in a pseudo-dynamic way, the optimal life of firms is finite.
In the second part of the paper we explore the implication of the model under a free
entry condition. In this setting each market is populated by a given number of firms, which
produce horizontally differentiated goods of a given vintage.
Monopolistic competition among varieties of the same age causes zero profits. In this
framework assuming a particular value of the elasticity of substitution, we have shown that
the optimal price strategy is similar to that one applied in the monopoly model. Each firm’s
price declines, as time passes. It cannot resist both the declining of market power due to the
ageing of the good and the additional market power deterioration due to the entrance of
varieties of the same age. The lifetime of products is shorter than the former model of
monopoly. Furthermore, the number of firms is smaller in old sectors than ones in the new
sectors, so the market is populated by a relatively higher number of new varieties, at expenses
of the old ones. Because of price decreasing and relatively youth of disposable varieties, the
welfare improves with respect to a world without free entry.
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